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Abstract 
 
Direct competition between full service airlines and no-frills carriers is intensifying 
across the world. American and European full service airlines have lost a significant 
proportion of their passengers to low cost carriers, the experience now being repeated in 
the domestic markets of Asia. This paper attempts to provide answers to a number of 
critical questions: What are the key drivers of each type of airline’s business model? Is 
there a difference in passengers’ perceptions between low cost carriers and full service 
incumbents in a mature European market and in a rapidly developing Asian economy? 
What are the principle reasons why a passenger chooses a particular airline model? How 
could a legacy carrier encourage passengers to return and so regain their domestic market 
share? These questions are addressed using information obtained in passenger surveys 
that were recently conducted in Europe and Asia.  
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1.0 Introduction 
 
The aim of this paper is to compare passengers’ selection criteria between a full service 
airline and a low cost carrier in a mature European market and in a rapidly growing Asian 
economy. Surveys have been undertaken to ascertain why passengers are choosing one 
particular airline over another. Passenger surveys involving Ryanair and Air Asia have 
not previously been conducted and this paper therefore contributes to the literature by 
examining the differences in passengers’ perceptions between the two airline models in 
contrasting geographical markets.  
 
The paper begins by examining the background of the selected carriers including traffic 
carried and operating cost performance. It then concentrates primarily on the surveys that 
were conducted in Europe and Asia, highlighting key findings such as passenger 
characteristics, journey purpose, booking methods, fares, connecting traffic, carrier 
choice criteria and types of trips undertaken in the previous twelve months.  
 
 
2.0  Background of the airlines surveyed 
 
Low cost carriers have reshaped the competitive environment within liberalised markets 
and have made significant impacts in the world’s domestic passenger markets, which had 
previously been largely controlled by full service network carriers. In Europe, 14% of 
Available Seat Miles are now provided by low cost airlines, with the two largest players 
easyJet and Ryanair accounting for nearly 9%. These carriers have pursued simplicity, 
efficiency, productivity and high utilization of assets to offer low fares. Table 1 below 
provides a summary of the main differentiating characteristics between incumbent 
network carriers and no-frills scheduled airlines. 
 
Table 1 
 
Prior to 2002, there were no significant low cost scheduled carriers operating in the Asia-
Pacific rim. Carriers such as JAL Express, Air Do and Skymark in Japan and Citilink in 
Indonesia existed some years earlier, but did not significantly impact their respective 
markets. The initial slow development was in part due to the perception that the low cost 
model adopted in the United States and Europe could not be replicated in Asia, because 
of the longer aircraft stage lengths, lack of secondary airports and regulatory restrictions 
preventing access to international markets. The latter being particularly relevant given 
that the bulk of traffic and revenues are drawn from international markets in Asia. 
 
Thus, the low cost experience is a relatively new phenomenon in the Asia Pacific rim 
with much of the necessary management experience brought in from outside the region, 
for example, from Ryanair. Asian low cost carriers accordingly are in the initial growth 
phase of their development, while many of their American and European counterparts are 
approaching or have reached maturity. Due to this, little data is available about low cost 
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operations in Asia. Table 2 highlights the surge in low cost airlines commencing 
operations in the Asia Pacific rim within the last two years. 
 
Table 2  
 
2.1 Ryanair and Aer Lingus  
 
Figures 1a and 1b below show the annual passenger traffic carried by Ryanair and Aer 
Lingus between 1997 and 2003 and their respective falling unit cost levels over this 
period. The incumbent has managed to reduce its unit cost to a level that it can now 
challenge its low fare rival. The carrier’s business model has been effectively reshaped in 
order for it to compete out of Irish markets with Ryanair. 
 
Figures 1a & 1b 
 
When Ryanair was restructured and re-launched as a low cost carrier in 1991, it carried 
0.7 million passengers and Aer Lingus transported 3.7 million. It took only 7 to 8 years 
for Ryanair to catch up. Fares charged by Aer Lingus on the Dublin-London and Cork –
London routes were cut by 70% when Ryanair entered the market (Barrett, 1999). 
 
During the late 1990s and early 2000s, Ryanair achieved a compound annual traffic 
growth rate of 30.5%. The company has set itself the target of becoming the largest 
airline in Europe with over 40 million passengers a year (Ryanair, 2002). This ambitious 
plan is evidenced by the airline taking delivery of its 51st Boeing 737-800 in March 2004.  
In late 2003 the carrier ordered 125 Boeing 737-800s and placed options on a further 125 
(ATI, 2003). It increased its capacity by 44% in 2003 alone and has tripled its seat 
capacity overall since 2000. 
 
A significant proportion of its earnings are derived from ancillary revenues. In 2003, the 
carrier made €28 million from commissions on car rentals, €23 million from in-flight 
sales, €12 million from Internet sales and €35 million from non-flight sales. It also gave 
away 20% of its flights for nothing in 2003 and aims for 50% free seats by 2009. 
  
Aer Lingus, the Irish flag carrier, which is 95% state-owned and part of the Oneworld 
alliance, now carries over 6 million passengers annually using 7 long-haul Airbus aircraft 
and 24 short-range types. The carrier’s 120 weekly transatlantic flights account for 40% 
of its revenue. Traffic feed via code sharing to British Airways at London Heathrow is 
key to its UK-Ireland profitability. 88% of Aer Lingus’ cargo business is accounted for 
by its transatlantic and German markets, however airfreight overall is important to 
Ireland as nearly one-quarter of the country’s exports and imports by value are 
transported by air.  
 
Aer Lingus’s structural reformation into a low fares airline caused Ryanair’s profits on 
the city pair to fall by 20% in 2003. In 2001, Aer Lingus had accumulated a net loss of 
€149 million and was losing €2.5 million a day, with passenger numbers having fallen by 
4.6% over the previous year. The new management instigated a survival plan targeting an 
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annual cost reduction of 16%, representing €90 million. The carrier turned in a net profit 
of €69 million in 2003, producing an operating margin of 9.3%. Between 2001 and 2003, 
the transformed carrier increased its passenger traffic by 7% and its load factor by 11%, 
while reducing seat capacity by 6%. Over the same period, Aer Lingus managed to 
reduce its operating costs significantly as a newly focused management team trimmed 
31% off fuel costs, 28% from airport charges, 51% off aircraft rentals, 12% from 
maintenance, 53% off distribution, 21% from staff cuts, 36% off overheads, 21% from 
depreciation and 49% off other miscellaneous direct operating costs, which netted the 
carrier an overall saving of €340 million. 
 
Tables 3 and 4 provide details of the passenger traffic carried by Aer Lingus and Ryanair 
between each main Irish airport and the five London airports between 1997 and 2002. 
The growth in traffic carried by Ryanair between 1997 and 2002 is very high, with 
Dublin - Stansted increasing by 36% and Cork-Stansted by 58%, while Shannon-Stansted 
grew by 300,000 passengers in just over three years. Aer Lingus has also witnessed a 
growth in its traffic, with passenger numbers on the Dublin-Heathrow route increasing by 
29% and on Cork-Heathrow by 30% between 1997 and 2002. The traffic carried by Aer 
Lingus on the Shannon-Heathrow route however remained flat over this period. 
 
Table 3 
 
Table 4 
 
By the end of 2002, low cost carriers accounted for one-third of the total intra-European 
market involving the UK and Ireland. Between Ireland and the UK, low cost carriers 
accounted for 47.2% of the traffic (Aviation Strategy, January 2003). By 2004, Ryanair 
has carried over 45 million passengers to/from Ireland since operations commenced in 
1985 (Ryanair, 2004).   
 
According to forecasts from Tourism Ireland, approximately 7.7 million tourists are 
expected to visit in 2005 and the tourism minister is expected to invest over €110 million 
in support of tourism of which almost €70 million will be spent in support of marketing 
and promotion. Travellers from Britain, France, Germany and the US accounted for 83% 
of the total number of visitors to Ireland in 2002. 
 
2.2 Air Asia and Malaysia Airlines 
 
The history of Malaysia’s Air Asia is similar to that of Ryanair, as both carriers have 
transformed themselves from loss making regional operators to profitable low cost 
airlines. Perhaps this is not surprising, given that Air Asia is managed by Conor 
McCarthy, an ex-Ryanair director. Besides attracting passengers from buses and ferries, 
both carriers have experienced a large proportion of first time flyers, largely attracted by 
the low fares on offer.  
 
Air Asia currently has a 30% share of the domestic Malaysian market. Since the airline’s 
inception in December 2001, the market has grown from 9 million passengers annually to 
13 million. Bankers are valuing the carrier between $750 million to $1.2 billion (Ionides, 
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2004). Currently, the airline has 14 Boeing 737-300s in its fleet and by the end of 2004 it 
will have acquired up to 30 aircraft, representing a 114% compound growth in capacity. 
In mid June 2004, it issued a tender to manufacturers that it was interested in acquiring 
up to 80 new aircraft comprising 40 firm orders and 40 options (ATI, June 2004). 
 
Figures 2a and 2b show passenger enplanements and unit costs for Malaysia Airlines and 
Air Asia between 1998 and 2004. The unit cost differential is very significant and is due 
to Malaysia Airlines excessive labour force, its poor productivity, low aircraft utilisation, 
unprofitable domestic routes and the limitations of intra-Asian bilaterals.    
  
Figures 2a & 2b  
 
With the world’s lowest unit cost of US$0.023/ASK and a passenger break-even load 
factor of 52%, Air Asia is showing all the signs of being a Ryanair clone. It has hedged 
100% of its fuel requirements for the next three years, achieves an aircraft turnaround 
time of 25 minutes, has a crew productivity level that is triple that of Malaysia Airlines 
and achieves an average aircraft utilisation rate of 13 hours a day. In comparison, 
Malaysia Airlines has hedged only 20% of its fuel requirements, achieves one-hour 
turnaround times and has an aircraft utilisation rate in the domestic market of just over 8 
hours a day. Air Asia has captured the growth in the domestic market of 4-5% in 2003 
and consequently left Malaysia Airlines with stagnant traffic.  
 
Equipped with a strong low cost formula, Air Asia is beginning to move into new intra-
Asian markets, such as Thailand, by developing a franchise, under the brand name ‘Thai 
Air Asia’. It is taking a 49% shareholding in the franchise, with the remaining shares 
being taken up by the Thai Prime Minister’s Thaksin Shinawatra’s Shin Corporation, 
which will enable the carrier to operate by acquiring international landing rights in what 
would otherwise be a tightly regulated environment. The partnership with the Thai 
government is having its benefits, as Sreenivasan (2003) has revealed. The current Thai 
transport minister Suriya Jungrungreangkit will remove the current minimum airfare 
regulations in order to open up the Thai market. The minimum airfare ruling was 
established to prevent the undercutting of fares in the local market, with the probable 
intention of safeguarding Thai airlines. 
 
Air Asia has also pushed forward with its expansion program into Indonesia, where it is 
operating out of three cities: Jakarta, Surabaya and Bandung. It is offering tickets priced 
between 40% and 50% lower than the other domestic carriers. This growth outside the 
domestic Malaysian market follows a similar strategy of Ryanair and easyJet in Europe, 
which have expanded by creating hubs in different neighbouring countries. This was 
achieved in the EU as a result of full deregulation of the sector, however. The tightly 
regulated international intra-Asian market is a major obstacle to the full-scale 
development of low cost carriers in the region. 
 
Malaysia Airlines, the country’s flag carrier, is over 90% owned by the government. It 
carries over 16 million passengers annually and has extensive code sharing agreements 
with 24 international airlines. The carrier’s fleet consists of 100 aircraft of which 54% are 
used in the domestic and intra-Asian markets. A further 10 aircraft are on order, including 
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6 A380s. It has an extensive overhaul and maintenance facility that specialises in engine 
and avionics repair. The currency crisis of 1997, followed by three successive years of 
poor revenues and a debt of $2.6 billion forced the Malaysian Government to intervene 
and rescue the airline. It transferred ownership of 73 aircraft, leases on another 17 and 
liabilities of $1.8 billion to the Malaysian Finance Ministry (Penerbangan Malaysia 
Berhad PMB). As a result, Malaysia Airlines today with nearly 22,000 employees 
operates on behalf of PMB. In 2002, the airline achieved a net group profit of $89 
million. Since then, the carrier has posted its best profit since 1985 of $121.4 million. 
However, it has achieved an average operating margin of only 0.3% in recent years.   
 
    
3.0 Methodology 
 
Using a similar methodology to that adopted by Mason (2001) and Turner (2003), data 
was collected in each of the two regions from two large groups of passengers, one flying 
with a low cost carrier and the other an incumbent. Both groups were travelling to the 
same city destination, but not necessarily to the same airport. There has been no previous 
research on passengers’ perceptions of low cost carriers in Asia.  
 
The airlines surveyed were Aer Lingus and Ryanair operating in the mature European 
market, and Malaysia Airlines and Air Asia operating in the recently liberalised 
Malaysian domestic market. The passengers were surveyed in the relaxed open landside 
area of the airport. The airports where permission was granted to undertake the surveys 
were Cork, Kerry1 and Shannon in Ireland, and Kuala Lumpur International in Malaysia. 
Large teams of personnel were involved in capturing the data, as pilot studies concluded 
that the second page of the survey was often omitted and it was important that all 
questions were understood and fully answered. The personnel also assisted with language 
barriers and in answering any issues raised regarding the open-ended questions, in which 
each respondent could give a personal response in his or her own words. A total of 281 
responses were collected at the Irish airports, 52% of which comprised Ryanair 
passengers, and 247 responses at Kuala Lumpur International airport, 48% of which were 
from Air Asia passengers. Each survey was conducted over a period of two days.  
 
 
4.0 Survey Findings 
 
As expected, the low-cost carriers attracted a high number of younger people, with 24% 
of the Ryanair passengers surveyed and 47% of Air Asia’s being in the under 24 years 
age group.  87% of this age group were travelling for non-business purposes that included 
visiting friends/family and trips to/from places of education. Parents mostly paid for these 
trips. For the 25-58 age group, which represented 84% of those surveyed, passenger 
choice changed considerably in favour of the incumbent carriers.  
 
                                                 
1 Only Ryanair flights depart from Kerry airport. 
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The age segregation between the carrier types is very clear, with the older passengers 
tending to prefer the incumbent carriers, possibly because these offer additional airline 
products not offered by the low cost carriers.  
 
Group travel is particularly significant to airline revenues. Business travellers usually 
tend to travel singularly but leisure travellers often journey in small groups. Low cost 
airlines carry more passengers who travel as part of a group than do the incumbent 
airlines, with almost 45% of Ryanair passengers travelling in pairs and 41% of Air Asia’s 
passengers travelling as part of a group of people comprising 3 or more.    
 
It is only in recent years that the incumbent carriers have sold discounted one-way 
tickets. This has been in response to the provision of such fares accessible via the Internet 
by the low cost carriers. Both low cost carriers surveyed had over 70% of their 
passengers purchasing return tickets (72% in the case of Air Asia and 76% in the case of 
Ryanair).  Aer Lingus’s passengers also had a significantly high percentage, with 80% 
booking a return ticket. By contrast, over 18% of Malaysia Airlines’ passengers were 
travelling on one-way tickets.  
 
The mode of surface access and the distance travelled to the departing airport was also 
ascertained. The significance of having a frequent high-speed, non-stop train service from 
the city centre of Kuala Lumpur to the airport was apparent, with one third of the 
passengers surveyed making use of this. In contrast, there is no such service linking any 
Irish airport, and on average 76% of passengers accessed their flights by personal car, 
which provides a significant income to the airport authorities in parking fees. 
 
Passengers were also asked how far they had travelled to the airport. In Malaysia, those 
who were using the national flag carrier travelled an average distance of 50 miles to reach 
the airport, while Air Asia passengers travelled an average of 77 miles. The distance from 
Kuala Lumpur to the international airport is approximately 40 miles. In Europe, the 
survey highlighted the fact that Ryanair passengers travelled 44% further than the 
incumbent carrier’s passengers in order to reach the airport. Lawton (2002) and Doganis 
(2001) have both referred to the fact that European passengers flying on a low cost carrier 
are travelling further to reach their departure airport. The positioning of secondary 
airports large distances from the major cities does not seem to pose a significant barrier to 
the use of low fare carriers.   
 
Finally, questions were asked about the type of accommodation used. There was a 
noticeable difference in the type of accommodation used by low cost airline users in 
Europe and those in Asia.  31% of Ryanair’s passengers stayed in hotels, while almost 
49% of Air Asia’s passengers stayed in places such as inns, guesthouses, bed and 
breakfast establishments, or hostels. The European travel trade has often suggested that 
passengers who travel on a low cost carrier tend to use the savings that were derived from 
the lower fares in staying at more luxurious accommodation, such as a hotel. The 
incumbent carriers’ passengers tended to opt for hotels, which generally reflects their 
requirement for additional full service attributes, with an average of 39% of them staying 
in this type of accommodation. 
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4.1 Journey Purpose 
 
Table 5 shows journey purpose and as expected, the two incumbent airlines carried a 
significant proportion of business traffic, with meetings being the primary reason for the 
trip. However, almost 29% of the Ryanair passengers surveyed were also travelling on 
business, which was only 8.5% less than the equivalent figure for Aer Lingus. Of 
significance here is the fact that Ryanair is operating to a secondary airport, which adds 
time and inconvenience for business travellers in getting into central London.  Some 40% 
of the passengers travelling for business purposes with Ryanair were going to events such 
as conferences and training courses. These journeys would generally be considered as 
being less urgent business trips. The low p-value means that the difference between the 
carriers is unlikely to be due to chance. 
 
Table 5 
 
Approximately 8% of Air Asia passengers, all of whom were male, were travelling for 
business purposes. The low p-values for the Asian carriers cited above reflects the fact 
that passengers are more likely to travel on Malaysia Airlines for meetings and 
conferences and are more likely to travel on Air Asia for sporting events and that these 
differences are statistically significant. In more mature European markets however, this 
trend is somewhat reversed.  
 
Table 6 provides details of the sizes of companies that the business passengers surveyed 
work for. It is perhaps not so surprising that such a high proportion of self-employed 
people choose the low cost carriers. A cross tabulation of self employed passengers and 
primary reason for choice of a low cost carrier revealed that 91% of these travellers chose 
the carrier primarily due to the fare and were not attracted by the extended full service 
products offered by the incumbent airlines. Business passengers travelling on incumbent 
airlines tend to come from larger companies that employ over 100 people. These 
companies would generally have larger travel budgets and would adopt corporate travel 
policies. Mason (2001) states that 73% of business passengers he surveyed at Heathrow 
had a company corporate travel policy, as opposed to 55% of the travellers using a low 
cost carrier at Luton airport. Over one third of Aer Lingus and Malaysia Airlines business 
passengers work for companies that employ over 1000 people, indicating corporate 
preference for the additional airline products that the full service carriers provide.  
 
Table 6 
 
The low cost carriers attracted proportionately more leisure traffic, with. Ryanair and Air 
Asia having respectively 10% and 22% higher proportions of their traffic comprising 
leisure users than their incumbent counterparts. It was also apparent that the biggest 
leisure market segment comes from those passengers who regularly visit friends and 
family. 
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Paci (1994) showed that the Asian leisure market, and in particular, the VFR segment 
was steadily growing and that culturally, time spent with family and friends is a very 
important leisure activity.  Air Asia’s VFR traffic represents almost a quarter of its total 
market, while that of Malaysia Airlines fewer than 17%. This segment represented the 
largest number of passengers carried on both surveyed airlines. Student travel accounted 
for the second largest non-business market. Cross-referencing indicated that most of this 
travel was paid for by parents, although the choice of airline was largely selected by the 
students. Most of these students have migrated from travelling on trains and buses to Air 
Asia. Overall, a large proportion of Air Asia’s passengers are first time flyers (Aviation 
Strategy, May 2003). The brand perception of lower fares, large network, high 
advertising awareness campaigns and 24 hour booking via the Internet is certainly 
pushing the Malaysian low cost carrier’s non-business market.  
  
The rivalry for domestic market share in Malaysia is just beginning to surface. Air Asia 
has taken away the annual domestic passenger market growth of 4-5% from Malaysia 
Airlines as domestic leisure traffic was stagnant in 2003 for the incumbent. This may be 
in part due to the fact that Malaysia Airlines does not advertise its domestic route 
network in the local media, in contrast to Air Asia, which has an aggressive media 
presence, somewhat mirroring that of Ryanair.  
 
Between 1993 and 1999, which covered the establishment and growth phase of Ryanair, 
annual VFR traffic from Ireland to the UK grew from around 500,000 to 835,000. The 
effect is even more revealing when considering VFR traffic from the UK to Ireland, 
which grew from 950,000 to 1.8 million per year over the same period (Mintel, 2000). 
This growth was primarily due to the large second and third generation Irish-British 
population living in the UK.  VFR traffic constituted the largest segment of non-business 
passengers surveyed, with respectively 20.5% of Aer Lingus and 27.7% of Ryanair 
passengers travelling for this purpose. 
  
The second biggest non-business segment consisted of passengers travelling for holiday 
and short break purposes. Both the low cost carriers sampled carry more of this type of 
traffic than the incumbents. In Europe, low cost scheduled carriers have encroached on 
the charter market. Williams (2001) argues that package tour charter carriers are 
vulnerable to low cost airlines on sectors of up to 2.5 hours, given that travellers can now 
integrate their own flights and accommodation into personalised package holidays via 
low cost carrier websites. However this is not the case in Malaysia, where there is an 
absence of such charter airlines. 
  
Short holiday breaks have become very significant representing an important market in 
the leisure sector. The two low cost carriers attracted slightly more short break travellers 
than the incumbents, with this sector accounting for an average of 12.5% of their traffic. 
Mintel (2002) estimates that UK nationals took 5.6 million short breaks in 2002, which 
represents around 15% of all UK holidays abroad. By 2005 this figure is forecast to 
increase to 7.2 million, accounting for around one fifth of international holidays.  
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The low cost airlines are extending their brands to capture this short break market. Air 
Asia is marketing inclusive packages on its website under ‘Go Holiday’, offering a wide 
range of mini-breaks consisting of 2-3 nights.  Ryanair also offers short break packages 
and advertises leisure activities on its website. These packages form an important part of 
additional ancillary revenue with the low cost airlines integrating package holidays into 
their core business model. These short break packages are generally absent from both the 
Aer Lingus and Malaysia Airlines websites.   
 
Attending sports events is the journey purpose for around one tenth of travellers. It was 
apparent that over 80% of groups that consisted of 4 or more passengers were travelling 
to sporting fixtures. Sporting activities are usually considered unimportant by tour 
operators and are left to the competencies and/or skills of local suppliers.  It would appear 
therefore that there is ample opportunity for low cost airlines to capitalise on this market. 
 
 
4.2 Booking Methods  
 
Table 7 below shows the distribution channels used by the passengers surveyed. The 
carriers are significantly associated with method of booking, with Ryanair passengers 
more likely to use the website (78%) than Aer Lingus passengers (58%). Many Aer 
Lingus passengers used a travel agent (16%), whereas this type of booking channel was 
not available to Ryanair passengers. There was no significant difference in the use of 
other booking methods. The contrast is even more apparent between Malaysia Airlines 
and Air Asia, with the latter’s passengers predominantly using the Internet to book their 
tickets and generally avoiding travel agents, while Malaysia Airlines passengers do the 
opposite. Malaysia Airlines in particular stands out, as there were no passengers that 
booked online due to the incumbent only introducing its online booking engine in late 
January 2004, when passengers became able to purchase domestic tickets to a select 
number of destinations. This would seem to confirm the findings of Gillan and Lall 
(2002), as the majority of tickets purchased were via travel agents or call centres. In 
2001, roughly 10% of the Malaysian population had personal computers, but this had 
increased to 18% by 2003, this technology enabling the development of low cost travel 
(Thomas, 2003). Low cost airlines are forcing change through the competitive advantage 
of online distribution and it is predicted that 25-30% of all Asian airline ticket sales will 
be online by 2005 (Ionides, 2001). 
 
Table 7 
 
There are only a small number of incumbents that have fully functional e-commerce 
websites in Asia, including Singapore Airlines and Cathay Pacific. Low cost airlines are 
formulated so that a large proportion of their sales are conducted via direct channels, such 
as host websites. Air Asia launched its online sales facility via www.airasia.com in its 
fifth month of operation and was the first airline in Asia to introduce Internet booking 
with online payments and ticket less travel. By May 2003, 45% of its bookings were 
made through the Internet (Thomas, 2003).  The carrier is extremely innovative, being the 
first airline worldwide to offer SMS booking, and is processing 2,000-3,000 messages per 
month. Additional channels include 10 sales offices and call centres each equipped with 
 11
over 180 lines that take 6,000 calls a day. The carrier has also been innovative in 
providing alternative distribution channels, such as enabling passengers to book tickets at 
post offices. 
 
Direct bookings were made by over 64% of Air Asia’s passengers surveyed. This rises to 
73.7% if the additional channels of office booked and family/friends are included. The 
call centre channel accounted for over 13% of bookings. A relatively large number of 
tickets (10%) were purchased on the day of departure, which normally represents the 
most expensive time to purchase a ticket.  
 
There is a very noticeable discrepancy between the booking profiles of Malaysia Airlines 
passengers and those of Air Asia. This reflects the incumbent’s inability to implement 
change (technology) and keep pace with its innovative rival. Even in countries where use 
of the Internet is not widespread, evidence shows that passengers will seek out all the 
available booking channels in order to access lower fares. 
 
93% of Ryanair passengers surveyed booked online (this includes the combination of a 
number of channels, such as website, office booked and family/friends). Ryanair is now 
the fifth most searched website worldwide, which demonstrates the strength of the low 
cost carrier brand.2  By contrast, 16.2% of Aer Lingus passengers used travel agents to 
book their tickets. Commissions by the carrier to the travel trade in the UK and Ireland 
have been cut to 1%; however in continental Europe commissions are still between 4% 
and 7%. In November 2001, Aer Lingus sold 1% of its tickets via the Internet, but by late 
2003 its Internet bookings had grown to 50%, with the carrier handling 10-12% of sales 
through its call centre. 
  
58.1% of Aer Lingus passengers surveyed booked online. The airline’s aggressive 
marketing campaign in promoting a strong brand is having an effect on the way tickets 
are now booked. It recently removed the shamrock logo from a number of its aircraft and 
replaced it with AerLingus.com, demonstrating its willingness to lose its trademark link 
with tradition and heritage in favour of an innovative and technological logo in order to 
gain competitive advantage. One of the principle reasons for the carrier’s financial 
reformation and its challenge to Ryanair has been the shift in its distribution channels. 
Aer Lingus benchmarked its passenger processing costs against those of Ryanair and 
declared that there was a €20 difference per passenger between the two carriers, the 
Internet providing the solution to this cost disadvantage (O’Toole and Pilling, 2003). 
 
4.3 Fares   
 
Lawton (2002) pointed out that the average fares of no frills carriers were some 40-60% 
lower than their full service competitors. Ryanair’s one-way fares averaged 50 Euros in 
2002, with the airline having become renowned for stimulating markets through its low 
fare offerings, which has given rise to the term ‘Ryanair effect’.  
                                                 
2 The 2003 Year End Google Zeitgeist survey (based on 55 billion searches over the past year), which 
tracks the most popular sites, ranks Ryanair.com as the fifth most searched for brand across the worldwide 
web. Ryanair news, December 22, 2002 at www.ryanair.com 
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Part of Ryanair’s strategy for market stimulation is the issuing of free tickets. For 
example, in the first six months of 2003, the carrier issued 100,000 free seats to celebrate 
the opening of its new base at Bergamo in January 2003; 66,000 free seats in May 2003 
when its competitor easyJet announced half yearly losses of €66 million; 70,000 on June 
12th to celebrate the fact that it had carried 70,000 more passengers in May than its low 
fare competitor; and 27,000 on June 16th for having a better level of punctuality for the 
27th consecutive week than easyJet. More recently, on April 20th 2004, Ryanair celebrated 
its 80 millionth passenger with 800,000 free seats and by August 19th it reached 90 
million and consequently gave away 900,000 seats at 90 pence. In five years’ time the 
carrier plans to give away 50% of its flights for free. Passengers’ perception is therefore 
to expect low fares from this no frills carrier.  
 
Only passengers on flights going only to the London airports from Ireland were surveyed. 
The average one-way fare paid by Ryanair passengers was €65 and the average return 
fare was €159. Taxes constituted €19.5 for Ireland-UK trips, with an additional €21.70 
for the return journey. If these taxes were deducted, then the fares would equate to 
approximately €45 one-way and approximately €117 for return journeys. The Aer Lingus 
average one-way fare paid by those surveyed was €82 and the average return fare was 
€183. The taxes in this case were higher as the carrier served different airports in the 
London area. The average one-way tax was approximately €20, and the tax on the return 
journey was an additional €28.  Again, if these taxes were subtracted then the fares would 
equate to approximately €62 one-way and €135 for return journeys.    
 
Table 8 shows the fare differences between the two Malaysian carriers surveyed on a 
number of routes. Shortly after the government assumed 6.9 billion Ringgits of Malaysia 
Airlines’ debt, the carrier cut fares by 50% on 14,000 seats a week to compete more 
effectively with Air Asia in the domestic market. The information shown in Table 8 takes 
account of these discounted fares. 
 
Table 8 
 
The low unit cost of Air Asia at US$0.023 cents per ASK3 enables the carrier to offer 
such low fares. As Malaysia Airlines loses money on its domestic operation, matching 
the low fares of Air Asia could be harmful to its financial viability, however it needs its 
domestic network to feed into the Kuala Lumpur hub.  
 
A further question related to how important the fare was in actually choosing a carrier. 
The results are shown in Figure 3. As expected, fare constituted the principle reason for 
choosing a low cost carrier.  Almost 65% of Aer Lingus passengers stated that fare had 
been the sole influencing factor in their choice of airline, while only 31.5% of Malaysia 
Airlines passengers did so. It is evident that a significant number of passengers travelling 
on incumbent carriers are also influenced by factors other than the fare paid.  
                                                 
3 Air Asia has the lowest operating costs in the airline industry. 
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Figure 3 
 
An attempt was made to assess the cross-price elasticity of demand between incumbents 
and low cost carriers. Figure 4 provides an indication of what proportion of a low cost 
carrier’s passengers would switch over to an incumbent if the full service provider 
reduced its fares respectively by 10%, 20% and 30%. The results show that if Aer Lingus 
and Malaysia Airlines were to reduce their fares by 10%, then 6.1% on average of 
Ryanair’s and Air Asia’s passengers would switch over to them. A further reduction to 
20% would persuade 19.6% of Ryanair’s passengers and 14.4% of Air Asia’s passengers 
to switch over to the respective incumbent carrier. 
 
Figure 4 
 
A significant aim of the survey was to find the fare levels at which a large number of 
passengers travelling on a low cost carrier would be willing to switch over to an 
incumbent airline. If the incumbent airlines reduced their fares by 30%, then 45.9% of 
Ryanair’s passengers and 39.4% of Air Asia’s passengers would be prepared to switch. 
There are a significant proportion of passengers however who would not transfer to any 
other carrier. The data shows that 40.6% of Air Asia’s passengers and 28% of Ryanair’s 
passengers would remain loyal. This is due to a combination of factors, such as brand 
development, fares, flight schedule, simplified website, package holidays, etc. 
 
Although low cost airlines are relatively new to Asia, they have already developed very 
strong low fare brands through strong advertising and clever use of the media. The wide 
perception of people in Malaysia, when acknowledging Air Asia, is that it represents low 
fares. Gilbert et al. (2001) argue that branding is becoming increasingly important as a 
means of product and service differentiation, and that the low cost airlines are building 
brand recognition to compete in such a competitive environment.   
  
Figure 5 provides an indication of what proportion of an incumbent carrier’s passengers 
would switch over to low cost airlines if it raised its fares by respectively 10%, 20% and 
30%. This information provides an indication of the amount of fare flexibility that 
incumbent airlines have and identifies the point at which passengers would begin to shift 
their custom to low cost carriers. Given incumbents offer the benefit of full service, 
including interlining, serving primary airports, business class, frequent flyer mileage, etc., 
some passengers are clearly willing to pay more for these features.   
 
Figure 5   
 
The survey data shows that fare increases of 10% and 20% would persuade 
approximately 5% and 14.8% respectively of the incumbents’ passengers to switch to low 
cost carriers, with the differences between the two carriers not being significant.4  If the 
incumbents however, raised their fares by 30%, then 42.8% of Aer Lingus’s passengers 
and 48.7% of Malaysia Airlines passengers would switch. An interesting observation 
                                                 
4 Statistical test of means, 10% significance level. 
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derived is that an average of 34.3% of the incumbents’ passengers would remain loyal, 
possibly due to the wide range of products/facilities offered.5  
  
It is clear that low cost carriers offer a strong substitute to the full service airline product. 
Not surprisingly, this has important implications for marketing and advertising – 
branding, customer loyalty and satisfaction should be carefully considered by every 
airline.  Interestingly, the results of the survey show that cross-price elasticity is not 
constant – in Figure 4, for example, a small fare reduction (10%) by the incumbent 
triggers a less than proportional switch, while a high one (30%) leads to a dramatic 
change. This defies the usual assumption made in various econometric models of 
constant cross-price elasticity and shows the importance of absolute fare levels in 
determining customer choice. 
 
Finally, to complete the discussion, income effects should be considered. Although the 
survey has not been designed to quantify explicitly any income effect, it is evident that 
consumer income does play an important role, as less wealthy consumers are more price-
conscious and hence more susceptible to a switch between airlines as a result of changes 
in fares.  Having said this, dynamic effects are highly important; air travel does not have 
the glamour of the past any more and the low cost carriers have managed to develop 
brands of their own. Therefore, when airport location and total travelling time are similar, 
low cost carriers may also become the preferred choice of more wealthy customers. 
 
 
 
4.4 Airline Connections   
 
Figure 6 shows the percentage of connecting traffic for both groups of carriers. A big 
feature of a full service carrier is the ability to interline traffic at its hub airport. As 
expected, there is a strong interline requirement for both flag carriers that operate hub and 
spoke networks. 41.2% of Aer Lingus passengers surveyed were interlining, as compared 
to 36.7% of those of Malaysia Airlines. This reflects an incumbent’s ability to leverage 
‘network benefits’ and thus attract a high proportion of passengers who wish to connect 
seamlessly.  
 
Figure 6 
 
Low cost airlines operate mostly on a point-to-point basis only. These carriers emphasise 
that they will not be responsible if passengers fail to make their connections, even if the 
onward journey is with the same carrier. The risk of failing to make a connection 
involves the traveller purchasing another ticket. Data from the surveys indicate that 
passengers are willing to accept that risk. 17.2% of Ryanair’s passengers questioned were 
transferring to other carriers at London Stansted. Ryanair’s creation of traffic bases 
across Europe has provided the opportunity for passengers to interline using a point-to-
point network. Air Asia’s transfer traffic was only 5.8%, which is not surprising as it was 
only formed in December 2001. 
                                                 
5 Statistical test of means, 5% significance level. 
 15
 
Figure 7 identifies the principle airlines to which the interlining passengers surveyed 
were transferring. It is apparent that the incumbent carriers have a significant proportion 
of their traffic transferring to alliance or code-sharing partners. Aer Lingus had 55.3% of 
its connecting passengers questioned transferring to the Oneworld alliance, of which the 
majority were transferring to British Airways.  By contrast, 72% of Ryanair’s passengers 
surveyed who were making connections continued their journeys from Stansted on other 
Ryanair flights, while around 20% connected with easyJet services. Ryanair operates 
close to 30% of the daily departures at London Stansted and 12.5% at Dublin, thus 
providing numerous permutations of connections and ample opportunity for passengers to 
transfer to other destinations. 
 
Figure 7 
 
Malaysia Airlines is not part of an alliance, but 68.5% of its connecting passengers 
surveyed were transferring to other code-share flights. Only 6.6% of Malaysia Airlines 
passengers questioned connected with Air Asia at Kuala Lumpur. Very few of Air Asia 
passengers surveyed were transferring: four were connecting to a Malaysia Airlines long 
haul service, while the remaining three were transferring to Air Asia flights. As the 
market begins to mature and Air Asia develops additional hubs, there will be a greater 
opportunity for passengers to transfer to other flights. The perception is evident in the 
Asian market that passengers can use a combination of carrier types to reach their 
destinations, and that interlining via a low cost carrier network is certainly a workable 
option. 
 
4.5 Principal Reasons for Carrier Selection 
 
43.8% of the two incumbents’ passengers questioned stated that they had looked at other 
carriers’ offerings prior to booking their flights.6 By contrast, 65.2% of the low cost 
carriers’ passengers surveyed stated that they had not considered other carriers’ services 
prior to booking their flights.7    
 
An important element of this research was to establish the principle reason why each 
passenger had selected a particular airline. A study undertaken by Proussaloglou and 
Koppleman (1995) on the demand for air carrier services concluded that carrier selection 
was based on a combination of factors that included the airline's market presence, 
schedule convenience, low fares, on time performance, reliability and the availability of 
frequent flier programs. Figure 8 provides confirmation of their results, with the evidence 
from this survey that passengers choose a full service carrier for a variety of reasons, 
including: service reliability, service quality, flight schedules, fares, connections, frequent 
flyer programs, comfort, safety and company policy. Passengers questioned chose an 
incumbent carrier in order to benefit from the wide range of services available and the 
high reliability associated with this type of airline. Service reliability was one of the top 
reasons for choosing an incumbent airline. 20.5% of Aer Lingus passengers and 18.7% of 
                                                 
6 Statistical test of means, 5% significance level. 
7 Statistical test of means, 10% significance level. 
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Malaysia Airlines passengers questioned selected this as their principle reason for carrier 
choice. 
 
Figure 8  
 
Figure 9 below shows that the low cost airlines’ passengers questioned had a very 
different principle reason for carrier selection. The majority replied that fare was by far 
the most important factor in choosing to fly on a low cost airline, with flight schedules 
coming a distant second. Turner (2003) also showed that passengers travelling on a low 
cost carrier selected fare as their principle reason for carrier choice, while passengers 
travelling on an incumbent carrier indicated flight timings. Ryanair has given away 20% 
of its flights for free in 2003, leading passengers to expect very cheap tickets from the 
carrier. 5.2% of Air Asia’s passengers identified the ability to book via the Internet as 
their most important reason for choice of carrier, with a further 4.3% citing the holiday 
package offered by the airline on their website.  
 
Figure 9  
 
The evidence presented in Figures 8 and 9 clearly confirms the principle differences in 
passengers’ perceptions between incumbent and low cost airlines. Passengers are 
selecting low cost carriers primarily because of their low fares, while passengers 
selecting full service airlines opt for them in part because of the additional product 
services they provide.   
 
 
 
5.0 Concluding comments 
 
Low cost carriers have reshaped the traditional airline business model and have 
significantly changed the competitive dynamics of the industry. Their highly successful 
model strictly adheres to the containment of operating costs.  Network carriers have gone 
virtually unchanged throughout the decades relying on hub and spoke systems, serving 
high to low yield customers and leveraging loyalty programmes, but they are burdened by 
high costs, complexities and inefficiencies. The incumbents are no longer the leaders of 
the airline industry in short haul markets.   
 
Two contrasting markets have been examined in this paper; the first, a mature Europe, 
where liberal skies have allowed low cost carriers to establish traffic hubs across 
international boundaries, and the second, an Asian economy, where strict bilaterals act to 
constrain such network developments. 
  
The survey has revealed that while there are differences between passengers travelling on 
a low cost carrier and those on a full service airline, there appears to be no difference in 
the attitude and perception of passengers from two very different continents. It would 
seem that the success of Air Asia in Malaysia, which was based on the Ryanair model 
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and which in turn was modelled on Southwest in the US, can be successfully replicated in 
any part of the world as passengers’ opinions and expectations appear consistent.  
 
There is a strong bias towards young people taking low cost carriers and it will be 
interesting to observe if these travellers migrate towards incumbents when they have 
more disposable income in the future. It is clear that passengers travelling on low cost 
carriers place great importance on price and appear to arrange their itineraries using the 
least expensive airfares. 65% of those passengers travelling on a low cost carrier 
surveyed did not look at any other carrier when booking their travel. It would appear 
therefore that the brand reputation of low fare airlines has become embedded into the 
minds of consumers.  
 
In contrast, passengers using full service airlines are concerned about price but will 
tolerate a higher fare in order to gain an advantage through the additional airline products 
offered by full service carriers. Historically, incumbents have been incapable of matching 
the fares of no-frills airlines because they were burdened with inefficient operating 
practices.  Low cost carriers are now dominating the leisure markets and are encroaching 
on business segments. There is significant business traffic for Ryanair especially from the 
self-employed and employees of small-medium sized enterprises, however large 
corporations still favour the incumbents, strongly indicating that corporate deals appear to 
work.  
 
Travellers are willing to connect through secondary airports and to accept no frills in 
exchange for low fares. Incumbents are retaining their complex and wide range of airline 
products as a counteractive strategy for higher fares. However, this research clearly 
indicates that this works only for a specific number of travellers. The way forward for 
incumbents is to reinvent themselves by adopting those elements of the low cost model 
that are pertinent to their requirements. The data ascertained from the survey provides 
evidence that if incumbents could reduce their fares by 30%, it would stimulate a 
significant number of passengers (over 40%) to switch from low cost carriers. It is clear 
that cross-price elasticities are far from constant, with small percentage changes in fare 
producing little effect while price changes above 20% result in large shifts in demand.  
 
It is apparent that passengers travelling on incumbents place strong emphasis on 
reliability, quality, flight schedules, connections, frequent flyer programmes and comfort, 
while travellers taking low cost carriers focus almost exclusively on fare. The surveys 
overall indicate that the ideal for passengers however, would be to have a combination of 
low fares (at no-frills airline levels) and some of the full service products offered by the 
incumbent airlines. It would seem therefore that passengers would like to see the two 
airline models become ever closer! 
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